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In the case of Cumberland, there are five portfolio managers; each portfolio manager directly runs about 20 percent of the firm capital. That means 80 percent of their capital is run by the other partners. They are interdependent on each other.

Tepper's group appears to have a loose organization without too much delineation of responsibility. Due to its different trading approach (computerized long-term trend following of managed futures), John W. Henry & Co. (JWH) is organized along functional lines.

At the end of the spectrum is Paloma. Sussman's culture is entrepreneurial based on independent managers. Sussman also describes it as a big family atmosphere—easygoing in both dress and demeanor. He wants an environment that makes the managers most productive.

At most firms, the overall profitability of the firm as well as the sector both determine the compensation scheme. At Kingdon Capital, portfolio managers take responsibility for their positions, but authority is shared. Each portfolio manager's reward is based on the performance of his or her positions plus a bonus pool for the entire firm based on that year's performance. At Appaloosa, profitability of the fund as well as sector performance are key.

At Maverick, sector heads have significant discretion and authority. They are rewarded on overall profitability of the fund and the contribution of their specific sectors, but more weight is given to the former.

At Galleon, compensation is based not only on profits of the firm but also, for the analysts, on the incremental research and expertise they add to the firm's knowledge.

At Citadel, Cumberland, Och-Ziff, and Stark Investments, however, the predominant source of compensation is the overall performance of the firm. Stark says that some years a certain part of the portfolio will do better than others. Yet compensation is very much the same for both sides if both are doing a great job. "You can do a great job in a tough market and still lose money."

At Caxton, individual performance is heavily weighted, but the group performance is also given some weight. At Omega, the portfolio managers and/or sector heads are highly accountable for their positions. They are compensated on the results of their profit/loss responsibility. If they don't prove their ability in two to three years, they are asked to leave. At Paloma, the managers receive an incentive fee over a specified hurdle.